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Studying like a communist: Affect, the Party, and the educational limits to
capitalism
Derek R. Ford
DePauw University
In an effort to theorize educational logics that are oppositional to capitalism, this article
explores what it means to study like a communist. I begin by drawing out the tight
connection between learning and capitalism, demonstrating that education is not a subset
but a motor of political-economic relations. Next, I turn to the concept of study, which is
being developed as an educational alternative to learning. While studying represents an
educational challenge to capitalism, I argue that there are political limitations to studying
for which we need to account. Specifically, studying is not in itself political, but only
represents the possibility of politics. To make this claim and to address these limitations,
I turn to Jodi Dean’s work on the communist Party. Dean posits the Party not as a master,
director, or prophet, but as an infrastructure of affective intensity that maintains a gap in
the order of things. I show that the Party is one way to organize and to defend study.
Throughout the article, I illuminate the ways in which educational philosophers can
contribute to political movement building by showing, developing, and refining the
educational components of politics that many organizers and theorists neglect.
Keywords: Study, affect, communism, political education, Jodi Dean, learning society
Introduction
Within the abundance of educational literature on neoliberalism—most of which is
concerned with issues of curriculum and policy—a provocative and insightful
philosophical exploration has emerged concerning the educational logic of neoliberal
capitalism.1 This conversation begins with the important observation that capitalism, as a
social, economic, and biopolitical regime is legitimated and reproduced through the logic
of learning. If we want to disrupt and combat capitalism, then, we need to not only
understand the logic of learning, but also to formulate and enact alternative educational
logics. Studying has been proposed as one such logic that is attracting the attention of
educational philosophers (e.g., Ford, 2016a; 2016b; Harney & Moten, 2013; Lewis, 2013;
Rocha, 2015). This research has provided insights into the ways in which there are
educational limits to capitalism. But, as I argue in this paper, it has not yet acknowledged
the ways in which there are political limits to studying. In other words, the leap from
alternative educational logic to oppositional educational logic has not yet been taken. The
purpose of this article is to inaugurate this leap. More precisely, the problem that I
identify is that studying, as heretofore theorized, only provides the opening for politics,
and thus remains trapped in what Jodi Dean (2016) refers to as the “beautiful moment” of
the crowd. To become a political force against capitalism, I contend, studying has to be
theorized in relationship to political organization.
I begin this project by drawing out the connection between learning and
capitalism, demonstrating why learning is so pivotal for the reproduction and
maintenance of capitalism’s hegemonic grip and, therefore, why it is an important target

for developing counter-hegemonies. Seen in this light, education does not follow from
but plays a key role in producing the political-economic order. I next move to an
elaboration of studying, drawing primarily on the work of Tyson E. Lewis. Studying here
is not positioned against learning writ large, but rather as a type of ellipses within
learning, as an act that opens education up to the possibility that things might be radically
otherwise. To draw out what I call the present political limits of study, I turn to Dean’s
recent book, Crowds and Party. Dean argues that the crowd event produces a discharge
of equality that introduces a gap in the present order. Reading Dean through Lewis, I
draw out how studying is the educational logic of the crowd. While the inauguration of
the gap of possibility that the study of the crowd generates is necessary for politics, it is
not sufficient. To back this up, I refer to two examples of radical study: hacking and
Occupy Wall Street. Taken together, these examples reveal that because studying lacks
direction and infrastructure, it can be reabsorbed within the dynamics of capital
accumulation or cut short through state repression. Dean offers a corrective that I suggest
educational philosophers should take seriously: the Party. For Dean, the Party is not a
master, director, or prophet, but rather a type of affective infrastructure that maintains the
gap of possibility and that, as I suggest, organizes and defends study, even in the direst
and seemingly hopeless of circumstances.
The educational limits to capitalism
If capitalism is predicated upon the dispersion of learning throughout society, then the
logic of learning represents a crucial educational limit to the reproduction of capitalist
social, economic, and biopolitical relationships, or what I will collectively refer to as
“production relations.” Employing a Foucauldian analysis, Maarten Simons and Jan
Masschelein (2008) have argued that the formation of a “learning apparatus” has been
central to the rise of neoliberal governmentality. Governmentality refers to the tethering
together of the state, the economy, and processes of subjectification. It is, in essence, “the
field of action that compels the individual to act by facilitating an internalization (or
subjectification) of rationalities or ‘regimes of truth’ that emanate from legal, health, or
educational apparatuses of the state” (Pierce, 2013, p. 13). Governmentality weds
together government and self-government, politics and subjectivity—and learning is the
fulcrum.
Simons and Masschelein (2008) make four points to demonstrate the centrality of
the learning apparatus in contemporary society. They first argue that learning has become
the main engine of the economy, which is variously conceived of as the knowledge,
information, or creative economy. Not only is education subjected to economics (which is
what most critiques of neoliberalism focus on), but education itself is a “supplier” of the
knowledge economy. Workers have knowledge, but they can always gain more
knowledge. This leads to the second supporting claim, which concerns the emergence of
“lifelong learning.” Because of the constantly changing nature of the economy and
society, we have to continually subject ourselves to learning in order to fit the needs of
global capital and to continually attain happiness, satisfaction, and health. The school, on
this model, teaches people how to learn so that they can enter adulthood, which is where
one never stops learning. Moreover, adulthood—true, autonomous being—is defined by
one taking responsibility for one’s own learning, and this is the third aspect of the

learning apparatus. “Learners,” in this perspective, “should become the ‘managers’ of
their own learning, for example, by developing their own learning strategy, monitoring
the process, and evaluating the results” (p. 400). The fourth point is that today the results
of learning have to be employable. This is what “competencies” means today: they are
the “outcome of learning and the input for the labor market and society” (p. 401). The
state is able to withdraw from the management of society and any responsibilities toward
the collective because there is no more collective; there is only an agglomeration of
individual entrepreneurial selves who are free to learn and relearn, and who are solely
responsible for their own lot in life.
Bringing Giorgio Agamben into the conversation, Lewis (2013) has identified the
notion of potentiality at the center of neoliberal capitalism and as that which drives
neoliberalism’s logic of learning. Potentiality can be broken down into two types: generic
and effective. Generic potentiality is the common meaning potentiality takes on, in which
potentiality is the passage from potentiality to actuality, from the state of “I can” to the
act of doing or being. Neoliberal capitalism and its logic of learning are “anchored in an
ontology of generic potentiality as a ‘not yet’ that ‘must be’ made manifest in measurably
determinate, socially useful, and economically manageable skill sets” (p. 6). Learning is
defined by the achievement of a pre-determined end, which is why learning is always
measureable and testable. Benchmarks are then established to chart one’s progress along
the way to a learning outcome, objective, or goal.
The irony of generic potentiality is that through the passage to actuality
potentiality is destroyed: one is no longer in potential, one no longer can but is. Thus, we
arrive at the other form of potential: effective potentiality, or potentiality freed from the
actualization imperative. Effective potentiality is, therefore, the potential to be and not to
be, to do and not to do. Whereas generic potentiality is a potentiality in relationship to a
particular thing or act, effective potentiality as the potentiality to not-be is “a potentiality
that has as its object potentiality itself” (Agamben, 1993/2007, p. 36). Potential is not
actualized but preserved and held within itself. Potential stays impotential.
Agamben sees these two types of potentiality as radically separate, and in doing
so, Lewis (2013), contends, he “takes for granted the existence of in-capabilities and
propensities as the necessary background for the appearance of capabilities. He assumes
that one can” (p. 45). Lewis, in turn, asserts a sort of dialectical relationship between
them, which is why he writes of im-potentiality. To be im-potential is to be able to be and
to be able to not be simultaneously, to experience potential freed from any predetermined
category or identity. The learning society eliminates im-potential because it is “obsessed
with the measure of what someone can do on order to fulfill a particular role within the
economy,” and this obsession with “assessment and verification of actualization is… a
form of evil that destroys the students’ freedom to not be” (Lewis, 2011, pp. 588-589).
True freedom, that is, is not the freedom to be this or that, but the freedom to be or to not
be this or that, and thus the freedom to be or to not be something else altogether.
Neoliberalism forecloses this freedom, it can’t tolerate it because it disrupts the demand
for performativity and efficiency. Thus, Lewis looks to the freedom of im-potentiality to
develop an alternative educational logic to learning: the logic(s) of studying.
Whereas learning is always concerned with and determined by ends (learning
goals, outcomes, etc.), studying is about means: it is definitional of studying that when
one engages in the act one does not have an end in mind. When one sets out to study

there may be an end in sight (a dissertation or a book, or a piece of information or a
theoretical development), but as one begins to study the end retreats. As Lewis (2014)
puts it, “The studier prefers not to engage in self-actualization… constantly moving
forward toward some kind of indeterminate goal while simultaneously withdrawing from
the very idea of goals in the first place” (p. 164). When we wander in the archives, or
when we follow link after link after link on the internet until we end up watching obscure
YouTube videos, the ends of our project are distanced or, more accurately, they are
suspended. In the learning society, such wandering is interpreted as procrastination. We
tend of think of what is actually studying as getting distracted and sidetracked. The state
of impotential has to be overcome as quickly as possible, and anything that interferes
with this process is a hinderance. This interpretation follows directly from the obsession
with actualizing potential and from the demand that learning contribute directly and
immediately to the functioning of capitalism and to self-actualization.
Studying can’t be properly said to “produce” works, for while studying surely
contributes to a product, its contributions can’t be delineated in any coherent way. Even
with hindsight studying resists strict signification. Studying instead leaves “traces,” and
Lewis identifies three of these traces that shed light on the logic of study. First, when
studying one “prefers not to.” “When deep in study and someone asks, ‘so what have you
found out?’ or ‘so what is your stance on x?,’ the studier prefers not to say, thus
withholding conclusions” (p. 164). It is not that the studier will not say, in which case
they would possess determinate knowledge that they refuse to share, and it is not that the
studier cannot say, in which case they would lack any potential answer. Instead, the
studier both can and cannot say. Second, studying takes place within the “no longer, not
yet.” When studying one is no longer ignorant but is not yet a master. Studying pushes
toward and withdraws from the command of knowledge. Third, studying is organized
around the “as not.” While learning about an object or idea we engage that object or idea
as it is, but while studying and object or idea we engage it as not. Lewis gives the
example of studying a car engine by taking it apart. This act is indistinguishable from a
mechanic taking apart a car engine for a certain goal and purpose. What distinguishes the
two engagements with the engine is the fact that the studier of the engine engages the
engine as not an engine. This frees the object up for unforeseen and unforeseeable uses;
activities are divorced from predetermined purposes, and signs from predetermined
significations.
Studying, it’s important to note, is not necessarily the opposite of learning.
“Studying,” Lewis (2013) writes, “suspends ends yet does not retreat into pure
potentiality. It is the ambiguous state of recessive sway that holds within itself this and
that without choosing either” (p. 147). Again, Lewis’ critique of Agamben is that he
doesn’t take into account the fact that learning is, in many ways, a presupposition to the
act of study in that to be im-potential requires. Studying opens up what has been learned
to the possibility of being otherwise, opening up ellipses within the learning society that
can be stretched to render it inoperative.
Crowd study and the beautiful moment
Learning orders students according to existing identities and capabilities, grading them
according to their ability to actualize sets of skills, knowlegdges, habits, and so on.

Learners are graded and ranked, their ability to conform to predetermined commands is
evaluated, and these evaluations subjectify the learner to corresponding economic, social,
and political roles. Not everyone’s potential is invested in, of course. Many are victims of
quite violent disinvestment. One set of learners “can” and another set “cannot.” The first
set are tasked with becoming self-entrepreneurs, constantly learning and relearning to
meet the constantly shifting global market society, and the latter set are subject variously
to abandonment and repression. Studying interrupts the demand to actualize potential by
introducing a hyphen in between potential and impotential, so that the slogan of the
studier becomes “I can… I cannot.” Studying is antagonistic to the learning regime and
the neoliberal production relations it reproduces because it is incommensurable with the
latter’s obsession with ends and measurability. While studying one prefers not to be this
or that category, this or that kind of worker, and capital accumulation and social progress
are thrown into crisis.
One of the most important things that Lewis’ theory of study does is reveal that
education is not a subset of or subservient to politics and economics. His work helps us
understand that forms of educational life do not follow from, but lie at the heart of,
politics. Yet while studying is antagonistic to capitalism and its learning society, the
manner in which this educational logic becomes a political force is underdeveloped at
best, and debilitating at worst. To make this argument, I want to turn to the recent work
of political and cultural theorist Jodi Dean, and in particular her book Crowds and Party.
While Dean doesn’t address education, learning, or studying, her insights nonetheless
have important implications for the matter at hand, for not only revealing the limitations
of studying as it has so far been theorized but, more importantly, for making studying
into a political force.
Toward the end of her 2012 book, The Communist Horizon, Dean (2012) noted
that “our political problem differs in a fundamental way from that of communists at the
beginning of the twentieth century-we have to organize individuals; they had to organize
masses” (196). Her new book begins here, with a theoretical and historical examination
of this contemporary subject of politics: the individual. The individual subject-form
leaves revolutionary politics fragmented and isolated, moving from local reform to local
reform without articulating any grand vision. The prominence of individuality results
from an assault on collectivity. One of the strange ways in which we embrace this assault
is when we turn to "do-it-yourself" politics, which, Dean (2016) writes, “is so unceasing
that ‘taking care of oneself’ appears as politically significant instead of a symptom of
collective failure—we let the social safety new unravel—and economic contraction—in a
viciously competitive job market we have no choice but to work on ourselves, constantly,
just to keep up” (p. 31). Dean sets out to reclaim this collectivity.
She begins by reading Althusser’s famous thesis on interpellation backwards,
standing it right-side up. In Althusser’s formulation, ideology interpellates individuals as
subjects. He gives the example of a police officer shouting, “Hey, you there!” When one
turns around in response to the hail, one is subjectified. Although, as Althusser repeatedly
clarifies, one is always-already a subject. Even before one enters the world they are
enmeshed within the familial, medical, legal, and other ideological apparatuses. Dean, on
the contrary, contends that instead of interpellating the individual as a subject, ideology
interpellates the subject as an individual. Rephrasing one of Althusser’s arguments, she
writes, “What do children learn in school? They learn that they are individuals” (p. 85).

Viewing interpellation as an act of individuation poses the individual subject-form as a
problem, as the result “of the enclosure of the common in never-ceasing efforts to repress,
deny, and foreclose collective political subjectivity… Rather than natural or given, the
individual form encloses into a singular bounded body collective bodies, ideas, affects,
desires, and drives” (p. 80).
When we are individuated we are separated from collectivity, isolated, trapped in
our fictional egos. Individuation, however, never works smoothly or totally, and the gaps
created by its non-completion or consistent failure are where the subject is located. The
gap is also the occasion of politics: “Political subjectivization involves forcing this nonidentity, making it felt as an effect of the subject” (p. 89). Dean refers to this as a split in
the people, which includes not just the split between those who have and those who don’t,
or between the included and excluded, but a split within the people’s consciousness, the
ways in which we aren’t fully presentable, transparent, or accountable to ourselves.
Individualization, that is, always fails, and the crowd seizes on and amplifies this failure,
forcing the people into the realm of what Lewis calls im-potentiality, that place of limbo
between subjectificaiton and desubjectification. Group dynamics and crowd theory are
important here, and in particular Gustave Le Bon and Freud. Le Bon, a conservative
racist who had nothing but contempt for the revolutionary crowds in the industrial centers
of the 19th century, identifies four key characteristics of the crowd: “contagion,
suggestion, affective intensification, and de-individualization” (p. 95). Freud, for his part,
appropriated crowd theory and Le Bon’s work to argue that the crowd is “a source of new
feelings, thoughts, and ideas” as well as “the novel consistency of a provisional being” (p.
100). To put it through two of Lewis’ traces of study, we could say that in the crowd we
experience ourselves as no longer ourselves but not quite an other self, and that we
experience ourselves as not ourselves.
The no longer, not yet and as not of the crowd can bring into being what Elias
Canetti called the crowd’s egalitarian discharge. The density of beings in place ordains
this libidinal excess, which liberates subjectivity from the individual subject form. The
equality of the crowd’s egalitarian discharge is thus not the equality of disparate
individuals, but an equality flowing from the dissolution of the boundaries of the
interpellated individual. The libidinal feeling of the egalitarian release enacts the affective
dynamics of the crowd. Specifically, the desire of the crowd is to increase, expand, and
endure, and it will do these things so long as it has a goal. “Direction,” as Dean writes,
“intensifies equality by providing a common goal. If the crowd is to continue to exist, the
goal must remain unattained. Expressed in Lacanian terms: desire is a desire to desire”
(pp. 122-123). This direction, of course, need not be explicit. In actuality, the direction of
the crowd is usually quite uncertain. Quite often the direction of the crowd is formulated
negatively, as an expression of anger and a desire to move away from some system,
event, structure, etc. The crowd emerges from within the gap of subjectivity, engaging us
in a process of joyful disindividuation that takes the form of an intense belonging. This
discharge, in turn, pushes us to want more, and it enables us to experience the force of
collectivity, accomplishing what we could not accomplish as single or even as aggregated
individuals.
The crowd experience of collectivity and equality is enamoring. Resisting and
breaking free from the enclosure of subjectivity and feeling the jouissance of desire can
feel like liberation. Some radical activists—Dean specifically calls out “autonomists,

insurrectionists, anarchists, and libertarian communists” (p. 125)—organize to achieve
precisely this “beautiful moment,” and their political program revolves around sustaining
the beautiful moment. This is not just a dangerous mistake, but a complete dead end, for
the crowd is not political. Rather, the crowd offers an opening for politics by installing a
gap in the order of things.
Here, it might be helpful to bring in another one of Althusser’s (2006) ideas: the
materialism of the encounter. Althusser begins his brilliant treatise simply: “It is raining,”
he writes. “Let this book therefore be, before all else, a book about ordinary rain” (p. 167).
In the ordinary rain Althusser sees Epicurus’ atoms flying parallel until there is what
Epicurus called a clinamen, or swerve. With this swerve, atoms encounter other atoms,
and the possibility of the new is produced. Yet it is only the possibility of the new, for the
encounter, as Althusser insists, has to take hold, has to endure and persist. Generation
takes place when the encounter is sustained, but there is nothing to guarantee whether or
not an encounter will take place, whether or not it will hold, and in what direction it will
go if it indeed does take hold. The encounter can thus take place, take hold, and take off.
The sustained encounter and its results are always a bit of a surprise, which “is what
strikes everyone so forcefully during the great commencements, turns or suspensions of
history… when the dice are, as it were, thrown back on the table unexpectedly” (p. 196).
In the crowd, people encounter one another, and as the boundaries between them dissolve,
as subjectivity resists and escapes enclosure, the chance opens for new political
arrangements and production relations. Yet, as Dean (2016) exhorts, this politics—this
beautiful moment of encounter—isn’t really politics, for “Politics combines the opening
with direction, with the insertion of the crowd disruption into a sequence or process that
pushes one way rather than another” (p. 125). The beautiful moment is when the
encounter takes place, but what will ensure that the encounter will take hold and that it
will take off in the right—or better, left—direction. Without paying attention to the
matter of organization and affirmative direction, the crowd and its educational logic can
be reabsorbed into the circuits of capitalist valorization, or worse, can work to strengthen
the rule of capital. This brings us to the political limits of studying.
The political limits to studying
Studying is, like the crowd event, a beautiful moment of encounter, the opening up of the
possible, the breeding ground of the new. While studying one is disindivuated, swaying
between subjectification and desubjectification, between being this and being that. The
studier resists classification, preferring not to actualize any predicate. And like the crowd
event, I contend, studying isn’t politics, it is only the occasion for politics, a necessary
but insufficient educational logic for the struggle against capitalist production relations
and for the common. Without something more, studying can retreat from impotentiality
into impotence, and, on the other hand, it can be actualized into something reactionary.
To illustrate these possibilities, I will turn to two examples.
The first example is of studying as hacking, when one takes some thing or process,
enters into and disrupts it. Hacking is an intervention that directs something toward other
ends and uses, detaching it from its attachments to other objects and processes,
potentially opening it up to the unforeseen and unforeseeable. In this way, hacking is a
transgression and the hacker is an outlaw, one who literally lives by transgressing the

lawful order that dictates propriety (who can do what with what). Lewis and Friedrich
(2016) bring up the Anonymous collective, which has “repurposed websites and servers
to expose particular contradictions and injustices in the capitalist system” (p. 244). Not
only their actions, but Anonymous’ very mode of organization is subversive in that
anyone can join. Membership in the collective is not predicated upon any particular
identity or a commitment to a specific end. Anonymous are “pirates who steal back
private code for common use, and in this sense open up the world of code to
unanticipated mutations” (ibid.). One of Anonymous’ first major actions was a swarm
attack on the Church of Scientology for their efforts to censor online criticism of the
Church. In addition to sending all-black faxes to their fax machines (to use up ink),
Anonymous members coordinated a Google bomb attack by linking “scientology” to a
host of other words, like “dangerous” and “cult,” to influence (redirect) any Google
searches for scientology. Through distributed denial-of-service attacks, in which multiple
computers the infrastructure of root nameservers, Anonymous hackers have shut down a
host of websites, from the Department of Justice (in response to the DoJ’s takedown of a
file-sharing network) to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (as part of a
national day of action against police brutality).
While hacking is indeed a reappropriation of code and a repurposing of the
networked infrastructure of contemporary capitalism, there is nothing inherently
revolutionary about hacking. For as many Anonymous actions that have supported
revolutionary political movements, there have been others that have arguably hindered
such movements. Consider Anonymous’ intervention in the “Arab Spring” uprisings as a
case in point. Anonymous sought to support the uprisings by attacking government
websites and publicizing the private information of government officials who were
opposing or repressing the protests. Yet in addition to attacking the governments of Egypt
and Tunisia, which were indeed repressing popular revolts, Anonymous also attacked the
government of Syria, which was battling a range of forces, including those associated
with al-Qaeda and its splinter group, Daesh, or the Islamic State in Syria. The situation in
Syria was much different than in Egypt or Tunisia, as the government retained popular
support and immediately engaged in a series of serious reforms, including the drafting of
an entirely new constitution (see Glazebrook, 2013). Indeed, it could be said that in Syria
the government was the progressive force. Or consider a spin-off of Anonymous, Ghost
Squad, which shut down the official website of the Loyal White Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan and the next week attacked the website of Black Lives Matter (before tweeting, “All
lives matter!”). Regardless of one’s position on these issues, conflicts, nation-states, and
so on, it is clear from these few examples that hacking doesn’t have a politics and that, as
an act of studying, it is not inherently against capitalist production relations.
The second example that I turn to here is meant to illustrate the potential apolitical
impotence of studying, and it brings us more directly into conversation with Dean. In the
last chapter of Lewis’ (2013) On Study, he turns to the early stages of the Occupy Wall
Street movement to articulate the “im-potential political dimension to studying” (p. 150).
Lewis celebrates the beginning stage of Occupy Wall Street as a form of collective,
public studying, especially in its absence of concrete demands. While the mainstream
press and politicians were anxious to hear what the protesters were demanding so they
could issue a response accordingly, the occupation “spent most of its time preferring not
to commit to any one demand over and above any other” (p. 152). Rather than actualize

political polemics and demands, articulating them into proposals that could then be
evaluated, occupiers produced a rupture within the received order of political struggle.
The occupation actively resisted the drive to achieve results and instead conducted an
ongoing study of politics, suspending the pursuit of measureable outcomes; engaging in
protest as not protest. As a result, efforts to grade Occupy falter, for there were no preestablished criteria with which to evaluate it.
Occupy celebrated horizontalism, leaderlessness, inclusivity, and the absence of
hierarchical structures. Neither an undifferentiated mass nor an agglomeration of
individuals, the occupiers formed a
state of exception where dichotomies and divisions were left idle, the homeless
the middle class, and a host of other intermediary grounds (including students)
met in an atopic space and time to study the sublime art of discussing across
differences and living across class divisions. What emerged was precisely the
question (and not the answer) of inclusion and exclusion facing not only OWS but
the contemporary learning society as such. (p. 159)
This state of exception was exemplified in the slogan, “We are the 99%!” The 99% was a
kind of non-identity, “a totally generic yet absolutely irreducible singularity” (p. 157), as
Lewis puts it. “We are the 99%!” took a quantity and transformed it into an indefinable
quality, a way of grouping people without resorting to predicates and already-established
identities. Just precisely who the 99% were (or are), was never fully delineated, couldn’t
quite be accounted for. The question was left open for collective study.
A major problem with this ongoing collective study, however, is that there was
nothing to defend it or to sustain it. Capital and its state weren’t studying, but were rather
gearing up to unleash a wave of repression that would eventually undo the occupation.
The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund has released several sets of documents obtained
through Freedom of Information Act requests that detail the dense network of
surveillance and repressive efforts that included offices of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the New York Stock Exchange, the
Federal Reserve, universities and colleges, major corporations, local police forces, and
local governments, as well as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the U.S.
Marshals Service (Partnership for Civil Justice Fund 2012; 2016). In this case, repression
opened the door to reabsorption, as many Occupiers entered to non-profit industrial
complex, or even started their own business ventures to profit from their activism.
Occupying and hacking represent study as embryonic political praxis, the
enactment of educational logics that are potentially antagonistic to capitalist production
relations and capital’s logic of learning. Whereas capitalism demands that everything—
even that which opposes it—be actualized so that it can be subsumed within its circuits of
productivity, occupying and hacking interrupt this seemingly ceaseless process, opening
up the world and subjectivity to the possibility of being otherwise than. Studying is
therefore, I proffer, the educational activity of the crowd, a way to pedagogically bring
forth the beautiful moment. This is a crucial element of struggle but, as Dean insists, it
isn’t properly a politics; it is merely an opening for politics. Writing again explicitly
about political movements, Dean (2016) writes:

The beautiful in-between of infinite potentiality can’t last forever. People get tired.
Some want a little predictability, reliable food sources, shelter, and medical care.
Others realize their doing all the work… The crowd isn’t an alternative political
arrangement; it’s the opening to a process of re-arrangement. (p. 142)
The question, then, is how to seize upon this opening and carry it forward into a real
revolutionary movement. How, in other words, to make the encounter take hold, how to
make it take off in a desirable direction? These are questions that, while they should
always be open to study, have to be answered, at least provisionally and contingently. Or
else the market and its advertising agencies will come knocking with an endless list of
glossy, high-definition answers. Or, alternatively, the state will come knocking down
doors, guns drawn and handcuffs aplenty. The encounter won’t take hold and the
possibility of the new will be foreclosed as the crowd is dispersed through redirection,
exhaustion, or repression.
Studying like a communist
We already have an answer—or, perhaps, the beginnings of an answer—to these
questions: the organizational form of the Party. The crowd craves affirmative direction
and it wants to persist, to spread, to keep the gap within the order of things open. This is
precisely what the Party does. Hence, Dean proposes that the primary role of the Party is
not that of the prophet, director, or master. Instead of providing answers and directions,
the Party is, more than anything else, a type of affective infrastructure that maintains the
gap of desire and, I would add, that sustains the practice of study.
To make this claim, Dean turns to the history of communist parties not where they
were strongest—like in the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China—but where
they were weakest: the U.S. and Britain. In particular, she turns to Vivian Gornick’s
(1977) beautiful book about the experience of former members of the Communist Party
of the USA, The Romance of American Communism. The book paints a portrait of the
CPUSA as an apparatus that generated feelings of imagination and possibility, as an
institutional configuration that, in the direst of circumstances, “held open a gap in the
given through which people could see themselves in collective struggle changing the
world” (Dean, 2016, p. 220). From the larger tasks (organizing workers and the
unemployed, protests, campaigns, and jail support), to the seemingly smaller tasks
(canvassing neighborhoods, organizing, facilitating and attending local meetings, selling
newspapers, making and distributing leaflets, raising funds), all Party work was not just
filled with a sense of purpose, immediacy, and enthusiasm, but served to generate these
feelings. As Dean puts it, “It wasn’t the vision that sustained the activity. The activity
was the practical optimism that sustained the vision” (p. 228).
Stated differently, it wasn’t that the Party’s vision was out there, something
external that had to be attained. Instead, the vision was internal, traversing the subject
and the collective. As Paul Levinson, who was raised in a New York City housing project
dominated by Communists in the early 20th century, says:
…it was alive. Intense, absorbing, filled with a kind of comradeship I never
against expect to know. In those basement clubrooms in The Coops, talking late

into the night, every night for years, we literally felt we were making history. Do
you know what I mean when I say that? We felt that what we thought and spoke
and decided upon in those basement rooms in the Bronx was going to have an
important effect on the entire world out there. (Gornick, 1977, p. 56)
The gap that the Party held open made it possible for members to study, to live within a
world no longer bourgeois but not yet communist, to transform routine activities (talking,
writing) into something profound and earthshaking. The world was not just thought of in
these terms, it was experienced in them.
The Party perspective, then, was two-fold. On the one hand, there was classconsciousness, a learning of the tendencies and laws of capital accumulation and the
dynamics of imperialism, racism, and national oppression. On the other hand, however,
was an affective intensity that things can be otherwise and that this otherwise is already
present, already germinating. “The perspective,” Dean (2016) says, “is like a law, the law
enabling communist desire, setting it apart from the capitalist world by holding up and
uniting the experiences of the oppressed.” This law isn’t external, however: “It’s a law
communist give themselves in order to hold themselves together when everything
conspires to pull them apart—police repression, fear and paranoia, individual desire and
need” (p. 243).
The only trace of study that seems to be absent in the Party is that of preferring
not. After all, the perspective of the party is proletarian, and its members emphatically
embrace and occupy this identity category. I want to propose that the Party occupies a
contradictory position in relation to preferring not. On the one hand, preferring not is a
fundamental feature of the crowd from which it emerges. This is most evident in the
crowd’s desire to desire, the requirement that the crowd’s wish be forever unfulfilled.
The crowd wants to endure, and this endurance depends, in part, upon its unmet desire.
Here, Lewis provides the Party with a preparatory pedagogy, for the act of preferring not
is, in lieu or in addition to the crowd event, what helps the student imagine the world
beyond capitalism. Yet on the other hand, the Party serves to orient the crowd, giving it
direction, ensuring that it doesn’t get reabsorbed into the circuits of capital or redirected
toward reactionary ends. It may be the case that the Party is forced to disavow its origins.
This is a question that I leave open for further study.
When engaging in political dialogue and action, it is not uncommon to hear
educational terms thrown around. We talk about testing our ideas in practice and about
learning from our history. We form study groups. We question and revise our methods of
facilitating meetings and of interacting with others. Politics is deeply educational. At the
same time, the educational components of political movement building are rarely
investigated in any rigorous manner. One of the most important contributions that
educational philosophy can offer radical politics is this investigation. We can develop the
tools, concepts, frameworks, and languages with which to understand contemporary
political educational processes, and with which to construct and enact alternative and
oppositional processes. In order to do this, however, we ourselves have to take up the
perspective of the Party, the dual commitment to the proletarian position and to holding
open the gap in the order of things.
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Most educational literature refers to “neoliberalism” or “neoliberal capitalism.” While
there is some value in this term, I prefer to speak of capitalism for three related reasons.
First, there is a tendency to write about neoliberalism without explaining what
neoliberalism is, which can lead to a good deal of confusion and misunderstanding.
Second, neoliberalism must always be seen as a particular manifestation of capitalism.
1

And third, neoliberalism is but one facet of the contemporary capitalist order, and paying
exclusive attention to it distracts us from the broader picture (see Malott & Ford, 2015).
When drawing on particular authors, however, I honor their word choice.

